Public Governance. A Blueprint for Political Action and Better Government by Rodolfo Apreda
UNIVERSIDAD DEL CEMA 




































                                                 
1 Professor Rodolfo Apreda holds a Ph. D. in Economics (University of Buenos Aires). 
Currently, he is Director of the Center for the Study of Public and Private Governance, 
Cegopp [www.cema.edu.ar/cegopp], at the University of Cema. Av. Cordoba 374, 
Room 612, Buenos Aires, C1054AAP, Argentina. Phone Number: 5411 6314 3000. His 
personal web Page has the address www.cema.edu.ar/u/ra. Public Governance – A Blueprint for Political Action and Better Government                   Rodolfo Apreda 
 














This paper sets forth a comprehensive viewpoint about how Public 
Governance should be assessed and worked-out, by making three 
contributions to the subject matter. Firstly, it provides the semantics by 
which this field of learning and practice may become operational in 
Political Science. Next, a four-tiered framework of analysis is laid bare, 
which deals with architecture, covenants and safeguards, collective 
action, and deviant behavior. Afterwards, and focusing on conflict 
systems, we give heed to the underlying logic of Public Governance, 
which stems from a network built up around the mechanisms of 
participation, contest and safeguarding.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Public Governance is a new approach to cope with manifold problems 
that currently hinder rather than help governments, and institutions as well, 
to duly meet their goals. Although those have been longstanding 
problems, Public Governance surprisingly evolved as a field of learning 
and practice of recent vintage.  
 
On the one hand, it took advantage of a parallel development, called 
Corporate Governance2, that stemmed from Financial Economics and 
spread fast to Economics and Political Science3. On the other hand, the 
increasing scope of global institutions contributed to a new assessment of 
how we should reshape the architecture of nations and political systems 
so that they can accomplish challenges and tasks arising from an 
international environment amazingly different from the one we were 
acquainted with before the 70s4.  
 
At last, but not least, three big events have definitely settled Public 
Governance as a going concern for politicians, lawmakers and decision-
makers all over the world: firstly, the sweeping wave of reforms in the State 
structure that privatizations, deregulations and a managerial culture have 
brought up on a global basis since the late 70s; secondly, the fall and 
implosion of Communism in Eastern Europe and, thirdly, the overarching 
acceptance of representative democracy as the dominant political 
paradygm for most countries on Earth.     
 
The roadmap for this paper is the following: 
 
In section 1, we introduce the general meaning of governance, by 
showing that consists of a field of learning and practice in the making, 
which addresses a set of distinctive issues all related with formal or 
informal organizations. 
 
The concept of governance is narrowed down in section 2, by focusing 
on the running of government layers and affairs, in what will be denoted 
as the Public Governance approach.   
                                                 
2 Which turns out to be a misnomer, since any organization in the private sector, not only 
corporations, own a governance structure.  
3 On the political determinants of Corporate Governance, Roe (2003) is essential, while 
Miller (1992) deals with managerial dilemmas and hierarchy. Background of the new 
approach to political architecture and governance are found in both MacIntyre (2003) 
and Kettl (2002).  
4 On this regard, Keohane (2001) conveys insightful proposals to global governance and 
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It is for section 3 to frame a four- tiered structure for the analysis of Public 
Governance grounded on architecture, covenants and safeguards, 
collective action, and deviant behavior.  
 
Section 4 brings to light the logic of Public Governance by means of 
theoretical connectors that fasten the four-tiered structure of analysis into 
a coherent setting: the study of conflicts of interests, the role of conflict-
systems, the linkages provided by participation and contest and, last of 
all, a network of covenants and safeguards among which we are going 
to enlarge upon the fiduciary role, agency relationships, agenda-building, 
accountability, transparency, as well as checks and balances.  
 
Lastly, in the concluding remarks, we bring the main statements and tools 
of analysis together, so as to exhibit the pervasive linkage between the 
four-tiered framework and the underlying logic of Public Governance. 
 
This paper grows out of a line of research on public and private 
governance started by the author in 20005, and intends to make three 
contributions: 
 
Firstly, it sets forth both a new operational semantics and a four-tiered 
structure for the handling of Public Governance distinctive issues. 
 
Secondly, it discloses the underlying logic of this field of learning and 
practice. 
 
Thirdly, the paper highlights how Public Governance deals with conflict 
systems by means of a mechanism of safeguards and covenants.  
     
 
1. GOVERNANCE AS A FIELD OF LEARNING AND PRACTICE 
  
Governance is a point in question to which many writers in social sciences 
and practitioners (including law-makers) have been giving their best effort 
and proficiency for the last three decades. However, it has not become a 
full-fledged discipline yet.  
 
In the corporate realm, for instance, research dates back only to thirty 
years. On the other hand, systematic study in global governance has 
evolved along an even shorter span of time. Whereas some issues that are 
                                                 
5 Apreda (2000, 2001, 2003, 2005a, 2005b) goes into greater details about such line of 
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at the roots of Public Governance have been topical for ages, its 
expansion in a sort of independent branch of knowledge is not long past. 
  
From a methodological viewpoint, therefore, mixed feelings arise when 
trying to set up a definition of governance. Rather than looking for a 
discipline, perhaps a more parsimonious frame of mind seems to regard 
the whole subject as an advancing field of learning and practice, a 
distinctive variety of what amount to be the scientific style of enquiry and 
validation6.  After this cautionary note, we are going to set forth a working 
definition.  
 
Definition 1  Field of Learning and Practice 
 
By a Field of Learning and Practice, it is understood a purposeful, enduring 
and rational endeavor around a particular subject whose underlying tasks 
are 
 
· to look for principles and goals attached to that subject; 
· to provide an explicit semantics for the core of the subject; 
· to draw basic and derived statements from a coherent logical 
system; 
· to design reliable procedures to deal with focal problems in 
actual practice; 
· to gather empirical evidence on which to ground either basic or 
derived statements. 
 
Any attempt to state the meaning of governance ought to supply a 
framework as broad as to give account of private organizations (either 
for-profit or non-profit), state-owned firms, governments (inclusive of all 
divisions, branches and agencies), international institutions [like the United 
Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the 
Organization for the Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)], 
and multinational regimes among several countries (as in the case of EU, 
NAFTA, MERCOSUR). Also, we must point to non-state organizations that 
have become key players in transnational relationships. 
 
Hence, the notion of governance calls for a streamlined definition to 
embody the expected functions that intuition and scholarship attach to 
the tasks of governing organizations or systems. 
 
                                                 
6 In this section, we are taking advantage of our former paper The Semantics of 
Governance, University of Cema, Working Paper Series, number 245,  (Apreda, 2003).  Public Governance – A Blueprint for Political Action and Better Government                   Rodolfo Apreda 
 
  5 
Definition 2  Governance 
 
By Governance we are to understand a field of learning and practice 
whose main targets are 
 
· the search of principles, rules, procedures and good practices that 
allow organizations to be efficaciously run within the constraints of 
evolving and changing institutions; 
· the design, implementation and follow-up of functional 
mechanisms for representation, voting, accountability, 
transparency, countervailing monitoring, incentives and standards 
of performance; 
· the management of conflict of interests and enforceable decision 
authority. 
 
The advantage of this definition lies on the flexible format it conveys, by 
which we can address particular shades of meaning and functions when 
dealing either with private, public and even global dimensions of analysis.     
 
Against a more general background, still beyond the one pertaining 
organizations, Governance may also be defined as the art and 
techniques to care for the way a system, even a single situation, may work 
as a matter of course. 
 
 
2. PUBLIC GOVERNANCE 
     
Governance in the public sector of any country refers to the running of 
the State, taking into account the mechanisms by which the government 
should work well.   
 
Whereas governance is a latecomer, Government has been a time-
honored field of study and practice since human beings built up structures 
and arrangements for living in society. A turning point in this learning 
process was the Peace of Westphalia (1648) that stands for a watershed in 
History and Political Science. It added to a new framework for the 
understanding of international relations, whose main features were the 
following: 
 
a) there are a set of sovereign states which behave like autonomous 
and rational actors any time they relate with each other; 
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b) these states claim the right for a distinctive territory, within which 
they exert full authority and control, that is to say, they become 
sovereign. 
 
The territorial issue amounts to the exercise of political authority over a 
geographical unit. Autonomy constrains any other state to not intrude in 
the domestic affairs of a certain state. 
 
It was from the Peace of Westphalia that the world has been witnessing to 
what extent such global arrangement evolved through an endless 
process of compromising its basic tenets, as Krasner (1995) so acutely 
remarked in his oft-quoted paper. It is hardly surprising that such a process 
might have fostered the interest in encompassing topics around the State 
and its government to the extent of setting the foundations for a scholarly 
field of inquiry and practice, to be undertaken independently from 
philosophical analysis. 
 
As regards Public Governance, however, academic and political 
involvement with this matter goes further back only three decades. It 
focuses neither in what the nature of government adds up to, nor intends 
to provide a theory about the management of government, both topics 
primarily found in the realm of the Political Science. Instead, Public 
Governance deals with governing structures and attempts to cope with a 
set of distinctive issues that overlap with Economics, Political Science, 
International Relations and Law.     
 
After these prefatory remarks, we intend to frame a suitable meaning of 
Public Governance7. 
 
Definition 3  Public Governance 
 
By Public Governance is meant the kind of governance that deals with 
organizations in representative democracies, bringing the following levels 
of analysis into focus:  
 
· The Founding Charter, Bill of Rights and the legal system of the 
underlying political system. 
· Institutional design: electoral system, representation mechanisms, 
the structure of separation of powers and the exercise of 
authority. 
                                                 
7 Contrast with definition 2 above. For a comprehensive account on the overlapping with 
corporate and global governance, see Apreda (2003). Public Governance – A Blueprint for Political Action and Better Government                   Rodolfo Apreda 
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· The processes by which government officials, representatives, 
and the judiciary are appointed, monitored, and replaced; the 
design of the governmental bureaucracy and its management. 
· The fiduciary role, agency relationships, agenda-building, 
accountability and transparency, as well as the whole array of 
checks and balances. 
· Integrity of the Judiciary; law enforcement; property rights. 
· The role of collective action: participation and opposition, 
political parties, groups of interest, veto-players, gatekeepers, 
and the media. 
· Rent-seeking, soft-budget constraint, political clientelism, state-
capture, tunneling, and corruption. 
 
It could be argued that a wide-ranging meaning of public governance 
would have come in handy to encompassing other political systems at 
variance with representative democracies. Although this track is feasible, 
we narrow down the scope of the definition to representative 
democracies, whose main institutional features were so clearly depicted 
by Przeworski et al. (1999): 
 
a) Rulers, those who govern, are selected through elections. 
b) While citizens are free to discuss, criticize, and demand at all times, 
they are not able to give legally binding instructions to the 
government. 
c) Rulers are subject to periodic elections.  
 
We have to bear in mind, however, that public governance also refers to 
smaller units in the State, like provinces (states), councils in towns and 
cities, legislative branches, government agencies, governors or mayors’ 
offices, defense and security’s structures, and the like.    
  
Before governance reached recognition as a field of learning and 
practice in the 70s, many scholars had delved into the variance and 
similarities between Political Theory and Organization Theory. On this 
account, Kaufmann (1964) did a remarkable job, trying to build a bridge 
to link both theories. More recently, the World Bank (1994) stressed the 
meaning of governance as follows: 
 
Good governance is epitomized by predictable, open, and enlightened policy making 
(that is, transparent processes); a bureaucracy imbued with a professional ethos; an 
executive arm of government accountable for its actions; and a strong civil society 
participating in public affairs; and all behaving under the rule of law. 
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2.1  GOVERNMENT, GOVERNANCE AND GOVERNABILITY 
 
At this juncture, it seems worthy of being recalled how Robert Dahl (1963) 
defined a political system as  
 
permanent patterns of human relationships involved with control, influence, power or 
authority.  
 
When those patterns develop into institutions, Dahl states that they turn 
into   
 
political roles, or offices, and the collection of offices in a political system constitutes the 
government of that system. 
  
Therefore, and taking advantage of our definition of Public Governance, 
we see that although there are differences between government and 
governance, a deep linkage can be tracked down on these concepts: 
the latter turns out to be the discussion and design of both means and 
ends for the former, within the context provided by certain political 
system. 
 
However, there are stringent distinctions between government and 
governance. For instance, an expert in Public Administration as Kettl 
(2002) underlines the contrast this fashion:  
 
a) government, which he defines as the set of institutions that deal with 
authority and bring about formal obligations among citizens, 
  
b) and governance, regarded by him as the set of processes and 
institutions, formal or informal, through which social action takes 
place.  
 
As for governability, it usually means an environment in which the 
successful governing ensues as a matter of course. In other words, it 
amounts to the condition of governableness. When a government loses 
ground, for instance through an impending crisis, policy failures, fierce 
opposition or people revolt, it is said that governability is threatened, even 
to the extent of toppling the incumbent government. In such environment 
governance stands by ready to provide safeguards to the political system 
and avoid disruptions, and grant  the fulfillment of the constitutional 
covenants8. 
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Last, but not least, governance is not only an outcome from the 
encompassing political system. In fact, we can perturb, even change the 
political system by drawing up a new governance structure, as the 
Founding Fathers did in Philadelphia, firstly in 1776 with the Declaration of 
Independence, and secondly in 1787 with the United States Constitution.  
 
 
3.  A FOUR-TIERED FRAMEWORK FOR THE ANALYSIS  
OF PUBLIC GOVERNANCE 
 
If we closely reviewed the inner frame of Definition 3, we could single out 
four layers that are embedded in such definition and become 
indispensable for the analysis of public governance.   
 
a) to begin with, we find the architectural features of governance;  
 
b) next, there is a complex set of inbuilt safeguards to prevent the 
governance design from pervading conflicts of interests and 
deviant behavior;  
 
c) afterwards, heed is given to participation mechanisms through 
collective action; 
 
d) lastly, the definition focuses on some outstanding patterns of 
deviant behavior. 
 
After describing each level in turn, I will move on to next section and deal 
with the underlying logic in the whole construct of public governance. 
 
LEVEL OF ARCHITECTURE 
 
There are three topics addressed in Definition 3 that distinctively point to 
the architecture of public governance, namely: 
 
· The Founding Charter, Bill of Rights and the legal structure of the 
underlying political system. 
· Institutional design: electoral system, representation mechanisms, 
the structure of separation of power and the exercise of 
authority. 
· The processes by which government officials, representatives, 
and the judiciary are appointed, monitored, and replaced; the 
design of the governmental bureaucracy and its management. 
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Any governance structure is grounded on a basic contract, the founding 
charter or Constitution, by which the goals to be pursued and the key 
rules of the game are made explicit. In keeping with this requirement, the 
constitutional compact becomes functional and enforceable only when 
a legal structure grows out of the surrounding political system. 
 
But the government is managed by either elected or appointed agents, a 
fact which calls for an institutional design that spells out how they could 
be elected, and their representation measured up to their actual 
performance.  
 
The political system being based on the exercise of authority, this feature 
must be painstakingly brought to light, which presupposes to draw up a 
scheme of separation of powers between a legislative body which passes 
laws, the judiciary which enforces the law, and the executive which runs 
the government. 
 
Ultimately, organizations and arrangements in the public sector hang on a 
permanent staff of people with expertise, qualifications and proficiency at 
dealing with the daily tasks of the government. This amounts to a 
bureaucracy to be managed as efficiently as it is possible, to the extent 
that patterns of behavior are most important than officials filling the slots in 
flesh. As Chester Barnard (1938) put it:  
 
“[any] organization is taken to consist of human activities, rather than human beings.”     
 
LEVEL OF SAFEGUARDS 
 
This level is depicted by means of the following items in the definition: 
 
· The fiduciary role, agency relationships, agenda-building, 
accountability, transparency and the whole array of checks and 
balances. 
· Integrity of the Judiciary; law enforcement; property rights. 
 
Whereas architecture provides the governance structure with its defining 
blueprint, a network of covenants and safeguards must be set up in 
representative democracies, so that the whole system could be kept 
performing without the entrenchment of factions or minorities that could 
carry out abuse of power, authoritarian patterns of ruling, as well a variety 
of deviant behavior.  
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Safeguards prevent conflicts of interests from running wild. For them to 
fulfill their function efficaciously, however, governance take for granted 
the integrity of the Judiciary and law enforcement, and also watch over 
the custody of property rights9.   
 
LEVEL OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 
 
· The role of collective action: participation and opposition, 
political parties, groups of interest, veto-players, gatekeepers, 
and the media. 
 
Governance barely consists of architecture and a system of safeguards 
only, since it thrives out of a political system. Therefore, collective action is 
a force to be reckoned with, through the competition of well-defined 
patterns of organized behavior like those found in political parties, groups 
of interests, veto-players, gatekeepers and the media. Their main task is to 
exercise voice in the natural inputs of any political system (for instance, 
the demands and support of the constituency; the wide array of claims 
and counterclaims of groups of interests) as well their output (decisions or 
policies carried out by the incumbent government; the empowerment of 
minority rights).  
 
Collective action takes place through social groups, a topic that was 
systematically discussed for the first time by Arthur Bentley, who remarked 
in his path-breaking book The Process of Government (1908, p. 269):  
 
All phenomena of government are phenomena of groups pressing one another, forming 
one another, and pushing out new groups and group representatives (the organs or 
agencies of government) to mediate the adjustments. It is only as we isolate these group 
activities, determine their representative values, and get the whole process stated in 
terms of them, that we approach to a satisfactory knowledge of government. 
  
On a narrower focus, Salisbury (1969) stressed the viewpoint of interest 
groups as exchange relationships, which is a suitable mindset when 
dealing with political organizations that are the main concern of Public 
Governance. To put it with his own words: 
 
Interest groups origins, growth, death, and associated lobbying activity may all be better 
explained if we regard them as exchange relationships between entrepreneurs 
(organizers), who invest capital in a set of benefits, which they offer to prospective 
members at a price-membership.  
 
                                                 
9 We are going to further this subject matter in section 4.4, devoted to the way Public 
Governance can deal with conflict systems.  Public Governance – A Blueprint for Political Action and Better Government                   Rodolfo Apreda 
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LEVEL OF DEVIANT BEHAVIOR 
 
· Rent-seeking, soft-budget constraint, political clientelism, state-
capture, tunneling and corruption. 
 
At the root of any founding charter there is a recognition that if men were 
angels, we would need neither constitution nor laws, as James Madison 
spelled out in Federalist10 number 51: 
 
Ambition must be made to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be 
connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be a reflection of human 
nature that such devices should be necessary to control the abuses of government. But 
what is government itself but the greatest of all reflections on human nature? If men were 
angels, no government would be necessary. 
 
Deviant behavior is a fact of life, and must be taken into account the 
same way we do with illnesses or ecological threats, since it gives rise to 
dysfunctionalities throughout any likely governance design.  
  
Outstanding examples of deviant behavior in Public Governance come 
portrayed by rent-seeking, soft-budget constraints, political clientelism, the 
capture of the state and tunneling. All these patterns of conduct amount 
to distinctive and pervading opportunistic behavior with guile, performed 
by representatives, public officials and politicians for their private gains, 
that is to say, corruption11 in government and high politics. 
 
Notionally introduced by Tullock (1967, 1993), the expression rent-seeking 
was firstly coined by Krueger (1974). It primarily conveys the idea of 
rational and self-seeking behavior that redistributes resources available to 
society. Tullock highlighted that lobbies are encouraged to effect wealth 
transfers by means of the government in a negative sum game as 
economic agents invest resources to profit from those transfers or forestall 
them from taking place. On the other hand, he laid stress on the fact that 
rent-seeking behavior has double costs: the distortionary effect of the rent 
itself, and the diversion of productive resources towards competition for 
the prize of the rent12. 
 
                                                 
10 The Federalist Papers, edited by I. Krammic, Viking Penguin, 1987. 
11 It is worthy of being remembered here how Robert Brooks, as early as in 1909, defined 
corruption, as consisting in “the intentional misperformance or neglect of a recognized 
duty, or the unwarranted excess of power, with the motive of gaining some advantage 
more or less directly personal.” (Political Science Quarterly, volume 24, number 1, p. 4) 
12 A further development of this topic, in connection with corporate governance, can be 
found in Apreda (2005c). Public Governance – A Blueprint for Political Action and Better Government                   Rodolfo Apreda 
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The phrase Soft-Budget Constraints points to the following environment: an 
unprofitable and failing company is bailed out either by the government 
or the company’s creditors, regardless whether it is a company in the 
private or the public sector of the economy. In other words, instead of 
keeping a tight budget, managers can soften the underlying constraints 
because additional cash flows are likely to come out of the government 
or creditors’ pockets, discouraging therefore a culture of financial 
discipline and responsibility. This was an issue firstly advanced by Kornai 
(1979) in the context of socialist economies, and then it was extended to 
capitalist economies, an updating of which can be found in Maskin 
(1999)13.  
 
By State-Capture is meant the efforts of business groups, trade unions, or 
non-governmental organizations to shape and influence the underlying 
rules of the game, mainly through the passing of laws that could benefit 
them, with an utter disregard of other sectors in society. In general, there is 
a trade-off of reciprocal favors between these stakeholders and the 
incumbent government, mainly under the guise of electoral and financial 
support for oncoming political campaigns14.  
 
Tunneling  consists in the hidden deviation, or the outright expropriation, of 
public resources in pursuit of non-accountable goals, and to the benefit 
of government officials, law-makers, the judiciary and political parties, 
union leaders, businessmen and politicians alike. 
 
The term was coined by researchers who were studying corporate 
governance crisis en emergent markets, in particular the one that took 
place in the Czech Republic (see, for example, Johnson et al. 2000). 
Among the main examples of this political perversion, we can highlight 
the following: 
 
a) To enrich government officials that steal and send the funds abroad 
to personal banking accounts in fiscal heavens or countries that are 
not concerned too much about the sources of such investments. 
 
b) Political Clientelism: the use of public funds to foster political 
ventures and reward party loyalty or groups of interests that behave 
like staunch supporters of the party in office; to finance electoral 
campaigns and to buy legislation; to provide with employment in 
the public sector to allies in any political engineering; to grant 
                                                 
13 See footnote 12. 
14 Hellman et al. (2000) give a useful account of this issue in the World Bank report, 
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business groups with favors in exchange for their backing. On this 
regard, some authors, like Sorauf (1959), draw a tight difference 
between patronage and this meaning of clientelism; while others, 
like Jonathan Fox (1994), argue that there is a long way from 
clientelism to citizenship15. 
 
c) To allocate resources to some chosen states (or provinces) instead 
of distributing them among other states, only because the 
government need to influence the former ones or reap electoral 
advantages from their support.  
 
d) To set up regulations that favor state owned companies or banks 
hurting private actors’ businesses. 
 
e) A long-standing tradition among Latin-American politicians seems 
to be the assumption that, because they devote their lives to 
“public service”, once in office they are entitled to claim personal 
ownership over the monetary resources of the state. In fact, they 
behave as if those resources were theirs and, hence, there is no 
duty to be held accountable to people on how they make up their 
minds about the allocation of those funds. This perverse, and most 
of the time criminal, development shows a devastating case in 
point for Tunneling and it could be labeled “the public money 
belongs to the party in office”.16 
 
 
4. THE UNDERLYING LOGIC OF PUBLIC GOVERNANCE 
 
When we turn to the underlying logic of Public Governance, we find out 
four theoretical connectors that fasten together the whole construct and 
stand by giving coherence to this field of learning and practice, namely 
 
                                                 
15 “A wide range of political systems, including many that hold regular elections, oblige 
the poor to sacrifice their political rights if they want access to distributional programs. 
Such conditionality interferes with the exercise of citizenship rights and therefore 
undermine the consolidation of democratic regimes. These relation of domination can 
be broadly understood in terms of clientelism, a relation based on political subordination 
in exchange for material resources.” 
16 World Bank´s experts attempt to measure governance through a wide array of 
indicators. For example, they have been resorting to “quality of bureaucracy” and the 
“level of corruption” (World Bank Governance: The World Bank Experience, 1994). Public Governance – A Blueprint for Political Action and Better Government                   Rodolfo Apreda 
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i. the study of conflicts of interests; 
ii. the role of conflict-systems; 
iii. participation and contest mechanisms; 
iv. the network of safeguards. 
 
4.1  CONFLICTS OF INTERESTS 
 
The study of conflicts of interest and the incentives for political agents to 
bring their personal goals into alignment with those of other actors or 
organizations to which they bind eventually, it has brought about a fertile 
subject for the last thirty years17. A definition will come in handy to our line 
of argument.  
 
Definition 5  Conflicts of interests 
 
We are going to say that economic actors A y B face or bear a conflict of 
interest when both are related in a context with the following features: 
 
the actor A´s interests are not fully compatible with those of actor 
B´s;  
 
such situation stems, firstly, from the fact that some of their interests, 
at least,  markedly differ; 
 
or, secondly, from the fact that the fulfillment of A´s interests could 
not be successfully pursued if B attempted his own ones as well. 
 
Political actors are forward-looking and end-seeker creatures. Therefore, A 
and B are likely to clash over their preferences, whenever they can not 
attain them at the same time or under the same circumstances. 
 
This is a flexible format of definition, to the extent that we can use it when 
a single actor suffers a conflict of interests between two activities or 
personal choices. For example, Mr. X could play a role R1 in performing 
like the company’s CEO and, at the same time, following a role R2 in 
acting as representative in the City Hall 18 at his town of residence. Broadly 
speaking, conflicts of interests can be classified as positive or negatives.  
 
                                                 
17 A comprehensive development in Apreda (2002a and 2005c).  
18 This example is at the core of the current debate on independent directors, after the 
wave of corporate scandals among which Enron and World Com became leading 
cases (Apreda, 2002b).  Public Governance – A Blueprint for Political Action and Better Government                   Rodolfo Apreda 
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By positive conflicts of interests we mean those that arise in competitive 
contexts in which the relationships, tasks, and expectations voluntarily 
follow enforceable rules of the game. Several examples come out of 
sports, suppliers’ contests, free-markets, language proficiency 
examinations, entrance tests to universities, electoral campaigns in 
representative democracies, as well artistic or academic contests in 
pursuit of scholarships, appointments or rewards.   
 
In contrast, we say that conflicts of interest are negative when they unfold 
through a pattern like this one: 
 
  - A and B realize there is a conflict of interest between them;  
- there is a growing awareness that chances could be profitable for 
one of the parties to the detriment of the other; 
- the time comes when one of the actors makes up her mind to not  
follow the rules of the game by the book, and then she pursues her  
own personal agenda showing disregard of the counterpart.   
 
This development of negative conflicts of interest rests at the root of many 
issues arising in Public Governance, accounting for the failure to hold up 
healthy political coalitions, the pervading frailty of international relations, 
or the difficult trade off between short- and long-term plans for any 
sustainable process of government. 
 
From the perspective we get from this environment, two or more political 
actors could find that their preferences cannot hold at the same time. 
Therefore, they must contest to get their expectations and goals fulfilled in 
due course. It is for representative democracies to shape the rules of the 
game so that the contest is kept running, mainly through political parties, 
voting procedures, groups of interest, and reputable gatekeepers. 
 
4.2   CONFLICT- SYSTEMS 
 
There is a common thread that runs through the four levels of analysis 
upon which we can ground Public Governance; it is conveyed by the 
notion of a purposive system with conflicts.  Let us move on, firstly, to 
frame the meaning of purpose-built systems and, secondly, to handle the 
basic features of those systems where conflicts arise as a fact of life.  
 
· Purposive Systems 
 
It is conventionally held that a purposive system is defined as any set of 
components that are linked by explicit relationships in the pursuit of one or Public Governance – A Blueprint for Political Action and Better Government                   Rodolfo Apreda 
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more goals. Let us see how the four levels already developed in section 3, 
can shape up a purposive system eventually.     
 
Components political actors, either groups or individuals, make for 
the elementary components of this structure. Their 
activities become meaningful either in the levels of 
collective action or those of deviant behavior. The 
fabric of this structure are political actions, which 
arrange themselves by means of performing roles and 
the working of groups of interest.     
 
Relationships interactions among the elementary components make 
sense within the context of the level of architecture 
and also the level of safeguards. They furnish social and 
political rules of the game by which political agents 
carry out their actions eventually.  
 
Goals they stem from the level of architecture, setting the 
pace to accomplish means and ends meaningfully. 
 
Looking for a deeper understanding of this concept, we must bear in 
mind that political purposive systems are complex to the extent of 
featuring the agent-structure problem that Wendt (1987) shaped in this 
fashion:  
 
a) human beings and organizations are purposeful actors whose actions help 
reproduce or transform the society in which they live; 
b) society is made up of social relationships, which structure the interactions 
between these purposeful actors.  
 
Among other reasons, the agent-structure problem supplies information 
about the pervading ways Public Governance structures may recast or 




In an insightful paper published in the early 60s, James March introduced 
the idea of conflict-systems, which helped him to shape a perspective 
from which organizations in the private sector could be regarded as 
political coalitions. It was not surprising that this work came out in The 
Journal of Politics19 since the whole approach intended to become 
consequential for political analysis as well. 
                                                 
19 James March (1962), The Business Firm as a Political Coalition, The Journal of Politics, 
volume 24, number 4, pp. 662-678. Public Governance – A Blueprint for Political Action and Better Government                   Rodolfo Apreda 
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By a conflict-system it is meant a purposive system in which 
 
a) the elementary components in the system are able to make a 
choice among alternative states of the system; 
 
b) there is conflict that arises from the fact that most preferred states 
of all the elementary components cannot be fulfilled at the same 
time.  
 
It follows from this discussion that Public Governance should be regarded 
as the management of four-tiered purposive systems pervaded by 
conflicts of interests. That means that the sum and substance in the 
governance of the public sector is aimed at the resolution of conflicts of 
interests.    
 
Nothing could be further from the truth  if we assume that the logic of 
governance does not also foster its own dynamics, which stems from the 
conflict-system itself. In general, and according to Jervis (1997), for 
purposive systems to become suitable in the analysis of political 
interactions and structures, we have to bear in mind the following 
characteristics: 
 
a) Elementary components are so deeply related that changes in a 
group of them brings about changes in other groups of components 
within the system. 
 
b) The whole arrangement of components, relationships, and goals, 
convey some features and patterns of behavior that are different from 
the ones we can find out of the single components. In other words, the 
whole cannot be explained by the summation of its building parts. 
 
c) Political actors do not carry out only one action at the time. On the 
contrary, they attempt and follow up manifold activities 
simultaneously. 
 
d) Frequently, actions disclose unintended consequences on different 
actors, even upon the system itself.  
 
4.3  PARTICIPATION AND CONTEST  
 
Looking for a key characteristic of a democracy, Robert Dahl (1971) 
argued that such distinguishing feature could be the continuing 
responsiveness of the government to the preferences of its citizens. For 
Dahl, this amounts to the fulfillment of the following conditions: Public Governance – A Blueprint for Political Action and Better Government                   Rodolfo Apreda 
 
  19 
a) citizens have right to make known their preferences; 
 
b) to signify their preferences to government and other political actors by 
means of individual or collective action; 
 
c) to secure from the government a receptive and fair understanding of 
their preferences.    
 
In fact, any process of democratization involves two overlapping and 
persistent activities, namely the right to participate, and the exercise of 
public contestation. The latter measures up how liberal or competitive the 
political system becomes, by enabling opposition and citizens altogether 
to voice their preferences. The former signals the extent of inclusiveness 
we can find out in that political system; in other words, how many of its 
citizens are allowed to participate in full, mainly through the 
empowerment of the voting franchise. Those systems that can exhibit such 
levels of collective action so that participation and opposition reach the 
highest degree of development are called Polyarchies20.  
 
Public Governance deals with conflict-systems that are complex, 
purposive and highly dynamic, because they change and evolve as time 
passes by. Among the many mechanisms that foster their dynamics, we 
are going to single out three illustrations that shed light on usual paths for 
participation and contest through political action: loyalty, voice and exit. 
     
Although the distinctive semantics for these words was firstly coined and 
expanded on by Hirschman in his already classic book (1977), he gave 
only scant heed to the public sector in that work. However, Hirschman 
later faced this topic again in a perceptive paper21 published in World 
Politics in 1978. We believe that his viewpoint is consequential for us to 
understand the logic of the Public Governance. 
 
Political agents or groups have manifold resources and paths of action to 
stand together for the political system, the government policy-making, 
the incumbent party in power, the state of the country, or the shape of 
the Fiscal Budget, just to underline some current examples. These are 
collective agreements that amount to loyal behavior. In fact, the better 
the governance, the more likely loyalty will follow as a matter of course. 
The logic of loyalty leads to mechanisms of support. 
 
We mean that actor A supports actor B either when: 
                                                 
20 Robert Dahl (1971). Polyarchy. Yale University Press. 
21 Exit, Voice and the State, World Politics, volume 31, number 1, pp. 90-107. Public Governance – A Blueprint for Political Action and Better Government                   Rodolfo Apreda 
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a) A acts on behalf of B; 
b) A agrees and looks for B´s goals or actions. 
 
That is to say, support ranges from broad cooperation levels, as it is 
conveyed in a), to advocacy and involvement.  
  
Taking the opposite standpoint, what can be said when disagreement, 
lurking conflicts of interests, widespread discontent, even displays of rage, 
turmoil and crisis spring up to surface? In those circumstances, political 
agents in representative democracies get access to a couple of 
behavioral resources: “voice” and “exit”.  
 
Either we can voice our claims within the current governance so as to get 
the grievances redressed, or we can exit by rejecting the governance in 
disagreement with its tenets or the ongoing development of political 
affairs.  
 
In the first environment, voice works as an insider force that attempts to 
improve, overhaul, or change some faulty components, relationships or 
goals in the Public Governance, regarded as a purposive system. At the 
architecture level, this amounts to reframe prevailing charters, institutions, 
or laws. Perhaps the problem lies with safeguards that become 
dysfunctional or non-enforceable. Surely, voice arises whenever deviant 
behavior has grown beyond the threshold of passions and interests. 
“Voice” calls for collective action to be heard so as to find responsiveness 
and the redress of the wrongdoings. 
 
But there are many settings in which voice is not successful, or the cost-
benefit ratio ends up so high that it prevents the claimers from being 
successful. In representative democracies the most usual exit device 
consists either in voting against the incumbent representatives or 
withdrawing political support.  
 
There are three other devices that could be added for the sake of 
understanding what “exit” really means, namely the mobility of financial 
assets, migration of people and, as a last resort, revolution. Whenever 
financial assets flee the country we face a powerful signal about mistrust, 
discontent, fear, or mounting unemployment. The more global and 
interconnected the world becomes, the stronger this “exit” behavior 
grows, pressing the incumbent government to cope with the crisis, or 
fostering the opposition to quicken the ousting of the party in office. On 
the other hand, migration consists in the voluntary crossing of the borders 
in pursuit of other home that could offer emigrants an environment in 
which they can find a more suitable governance to live in. Public Governance – A Blueprint for Political Action and Better Government                   Rodolfo Apreda 
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Exit seems to be a worrisome subject, mainly because of its double-
edged nature.  
 
a) When it does mean voting or withdrawing political support, we exit 
without departing from the public governance to which we 
belong. Plainly, we follow the book, agreeing to the constraints set 
by the rules of the game. The architecture level provides room for 
granting “exit” mechanisms from within the institutional design, and 
collective action brings about political withdrawals by means of 
political parties, veto players, groups of interest and the watchdogs 
of the system (including the media).  
 
b) But the other face of the coin shows the political agent or group 
exiting the governance itself. At this point, “exit” stands for utter 
rejection, and it can end up in civil disobedience, revolt or 




4.4 HOW DO PUBLIC GOVERNANCE DEAL WITH CONFLICT SYSTEMS? 
(THE NETWORK OF COVENANTS AND SAFEGUARDS) 
 
When we give heed to the underlying logic of Public Governance, we 
must wonder how this field of learning and practice becomes suitable for 
dealing with conflict-systems.  
 
The answer is provided by Definition 3, which conveys mechanisms for 
conflict resolution, by means of a network of covenants and safeguards:  
 
· the fiduciary role,  




· checks and balances. 
 
THE FIDUCIARY ROLE 
 
By fiduciary agent it is usually meant “one who owes to another the duties 
of good faith, trust, confidence and candor” (The Black’s Law Dictionary).  
 
A natural extension of this meaning is given by the same source, and it 
applies to any  fiduciary relationship, in which  
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“one actor is under a duty to act for the benefit of other actor, on matters within the 
scope of the relationship.” 
 
Outstanding examples of this relationship are found in those linking 
trustees with beneficiaries, agents with principals, attorneys with clients. 
 
In representative democracies the fiduciary role can be regarded its 
foundational feature, being its most important illustration the covenant 




The common feature behind this sort of relationship shows that one of the 
parties, the agent, willingly behaves on behalf of the other, the principal, 
who grants compensation on account of effort and diligence. Such 
consequential notion calls for more precision.   
 
Definition 6  Agency relationship 
 
We say that between actors A and P (single or collective) there is an 
agency relationship when they carry out the following agreement: 
 
Firstly, actor A, known as the agent, commits effort, capacity and 
diligence on behalf of P; 
 
Secondly, actor P, known as the principal, commits compensation 
and incentives to the agent;  
 
Lastly, either explicitly or implicitly, the relationship binds agent and 
principal to their mutual advantage.    
 
In order to deal with this important covenant in a functional way, some 
remarks are worthy of being noticed: 
 
a) in general, the principal endows the agent with decision-making 
rights;  
 
b) there can be one or more principals, one or more agents22;  
 
c) whereas the actor will perform as principal in a context, he 
becomes an agent in another context;  
                                                 
22 Teamwork as a source of agency problems is of the essence for the study of 
organizations (Miller,1992).  Public Governance – A Blueprint for Political Action and Better Government                   Rodolfo Apreda 
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d) the agency relationship may be regarded as an instance of a 
fiduciary relationship; 
 
e) compensation does not stand for monetary rewards only, since 
political actors frequently seek public goals like reputation, a call 
for service, the feeling of civic commitment, even the seeking of 
power.     
 
Representatives and public officials behave as agents of citizens, but they 
become the rulers of their principals who submit, even with coercion, to 




For Public Governance to grant responsiveness from the incumbent 
government to the manifold desires and wishes of the people, the 
architecture level must supply the blueprint for action, which leads to the 
issue of agenda building for decision-making processes. Not surprisingly, 
agenda-building is a key feature of political decision-making.  
 
By agenda-building it is meant the process by which the relevant 
decision-makers could commit due care as well as diligence to those 
issues that become worthy of being discussed on the grounds of public 
concerns, social disagreements or political controversies.  
 
For the sake of argument, it is advisable to single out two broad types of 
agendas23:  
 
a) The public agenda, which consists of issues that translate a 
demand for action and reach a level of public exposure so that 
they must be noticed. 
 
b) The formal agenda, which consists of those issues that decision-
makers choose to add to the current agenda of discussion. 
 
When negotiating, political actors set up their personal agendas, which 
consist of accessible options they keep open, either to choose one 
among them or to have them in store for forward decision-making. 
However, this is a misleading definition unless we lay bare two features 
that hinge upon any sensible discussion of the issue: 
                                                 
23 This approach was firstly suggested by Cobb and Elder (1971); lately, its scope was 
widened by Cobb, Ross and Ross (1976). Public and formal agendas were also labeled 
systemic and institutional agendas, respectively.   Public Governance – A Blueprint for Political Action and Better Government                   Rodolfo Apreda 
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· asymmetric information; 
· transaction costs. 
 
Different endowments of information make some actors more powerful 
than others, and the problem is compounded by opportunistic behavior 
from the side of some players. Transaction costs prevent weak actors with 
fewer resources from contesting and prevailing over stronger ones. 
  
If we move on to agendas that have to be settled for a group of actors, 
then we could be entangled in a daunting task, because this time we 
have to cope with an agenda that arises from collective action. This is the 
point where the Fiduciary Role set a plausible benchmark on behalf of the 
participants and provides with a standard of fairness on the thorny issue of 
controlling the agenda .  
 
Therefore, when we deal with a collective agenda-setting problem, the 
distinctive question we should have to raise seems the following: 
 
What is the extent of influence for any political actor to decide which are 
the options that must be included, and which are the ones that should be 
ruled out? 
 
To enhance public governance, political agents must live up to their 
fiduciary expectations when they try to answer the former question. In a 
nutshell: 
 
Agenda-setting is a task in which each political actor taking part in the 
negotiation has forcefulness, voice and vote. Only when this is granted, 




Either in private or public environments, “accountability” is regarded as a 
functional device to grant a sustainable governance. Accountability is a 
relational notion, that is to say, it involves two parties, each of which can 
be single or complex. Usually, it comes to be defined24 as the state of 
being responsible or answerable, but this perspective neglects a crucial 
component that makes for the foundation of this concept: the underlying 
prior commitments. Hence, it seems advisable to shape a more 
comprehensive meaning 25. 
 
                                                 
24 See, for instance, the Black´s Law Dictionary. 
25 This task has earlier been attempted by Apreda (2003, 2005b). Public Governance – A Blueprint for Political Action and Better Government                   Rodolfo Apreda 
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Definition 4  Accountability 
 
By Accountability is meant a relationship that takes place between two 
parties and that can be broken down into complementary layers of 
practice, the first one before the facts evolve, the other one while the 
facts evolve or come to fulfillment: 
 
a) Ex~ante practice: one party commits something to be done on 
behalf of another  
 
b) Ex~post practice: by which the same party is held to account for 
the performance of his commitment to the other.  
 
To put this formal format in plain words, accountability deals not only with 
responsibility, as it is customarily stressed, but also with a previous 
commitment from which responsibility can be claimed. In a political 
system, accountability allows citizens to control the running of the State 




On the side of responsibilities there are mechanisms to hold 
representatives and officials accountable, like regular general elections 
and law enforcement. In keeping with accountability, and from the side 
of commitments, we must bring the subject of transparency into focus. 
 
As far as transparency is concerned, it has to do with information about 
actions and characteristics deployed by the actors in any relationship. The 
more transparency we assure, the more functional our information 
becomes for reaching high levels of accountability. 
 
For the information to be transparent, we request from it to be produced 
in timely, reliably, meaningful, and testable fashion, with full disclosure of 
sources. 
 
In fact, transparency allows to assess whether people and organizations 
behavior are responsible in the sense of being explainable, which leads to 
a considered decision-making with due regard for the consequences. 
 
CHECKS AND BALANCES 
  
In dealing with political actors and their organizations, we must build up 
constraints to groups’ behavior, so as to preclude the exercise of arbitrary 
power or influence that could bring harm to other groups’ interests. A Public Governance – A Blueprint for Political Action and Better Government                   Rodolfo Apreda 
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representative democracy can be regarded as a system that controls 
groups and government agencies, and provides countervailing 
procedures to redress any flouting of the Constitution and the Law. In 
other words: 
    
By Checks and Balances, we understand a system by which some group 
of political actors in the government can restrain other groups from 
becoming too powerful or influential, by setting up standards of 
agreement about what kind of actions or decisions abide by the law and 
the constitution.    
 
For example, branches in a system of separate powers are subject to 
political discipline through the mechanisms of appointment and budget 
allocation, as well as discharge procedures and legislative overruling.  
 
It seems worthy of being noticed the actual contrast between the so-
called principle of separation of powers and the principle of checks and 
balances. The former amounts to three functions of government that are 
entrusted to different branches. The latter conveys the idea of any branch 
checking functions of the others (for instance, by means of veto-playing 
or constitutional review). 
 
On the grounds of separation of powers, checks and balances allow any 
branch of the government (legislative, executive and judicial) to audit the 
actions of any other, so that neither of them could encroach in their 
counterparts’ distinctive duties and tasks.  As Madison26 spelled out in 
Federalist 51: 
 
If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would 
be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, 
the great difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to control the 
governed; and in the next place oblige it to control itself. A dependence on the people, 
is no doubt, the primary control on the government; but experience has taught mankind 





Our starting point was the laying of semantical foundations for Public 
Governance, an option intended to enhance the study of this subject-
matter. In fact, the inner structure of the chosen definition directly led to a 
four-tiered framework of inquiry, which enables the study of single 
                                                 
26 See footnote 9.  Public Governance – A Blueprint for Political Action and Better Government                   Rodolfo Apreda 
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governances, as well as the comparison and contrast of actual 
governances arising in the real world. 
 
Such framework (see the exhibit in next page) comprises four levels of 
analysis, namely 
 
a) architecture, which furnishes the rules of the game for alternative 
institutional environments; 
 
b) safeguards, which stands as a network of covenants and resources 
to keep the governance structure running steadily so as to meet its 
goals; 
 
c) collective action, by which political actors and groups participate 
and contest, bringing about a dynamics without which 
governance could not become a blueprint for action and 
government;  
 
d) deviant behavior, whose study of which prevent disfunctionalities 
from putting the governance in peril. 
 
After developing our approach to Public Governance, we looked into the 
underlying logic of the construct, mainly to answer two demanding 
questions that should not be sidestepped: 
 
i) What are the inner workings of Public Governance? 
ii) How is it that Public Governance becomes so relevant and close 
to the facts? 
 
To answer these questions, we delved into four issues that stay at the roots 
of any governance design, namely 
 
a) conflict of interests; 
b) the role of conflict systems; 
c) participation and contest; 
d) the network of covenants and safeguards. 
 
These factors map onto the four-tiered framework, since both are 
pervasively overlapping each other, so as to make meaningful the core 
task of Public Governance: to perform as a blueprint for political action 
and better government.        
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